William I was the second son of Frederick William III and Queen Louise. Like his elder brother he had been deeply affected by the misfortunes Prussia and its royal family had suffered at the hands of Napoleon. Since those days he had never discarded his uniform and throughout his life considered himself first and foremost a soldier. When he was 17 he received his baptism of fire in the France of 1814. He seems to have taken little interest in the Prussian Reform Movement except for one of its important aspects, that of military reform.
Open conflict erupted between King and parliament. Adolf Hermann Hagen, a Progressive, demanded a more detailed specification of the budget in order to prevent the government’s uncontrolled use of funds for military purposes. His resolution was accepted by a majority in the diet. This now compelled the Liberal members of the government to submit their resignations and the King dissolved the diet on 11 March 1862. New elections were held on 6 May in which the Progressive Party gained 133 seats while the total of the opposition was 230, the Conservatives dwindling down to 11 seats and the Catholics to 28. On 17 September William I rejected attempts at a renewed compromise of reducing military service from three to two years in return for the acceptance of the budget. For the first time the King thought of abdication. Now Hohenlohe and another minister, von der Heydt, resigned. Roon had another candidate for the office of prime minister: Otto von Bismarck, or the ‘mad Junker’ as he had once been called.
Yet the picture of Bismarck as the epitome of the typical Prussian Junker is a caricature – in spite of ample evidence of his occasionally exaggerated projection of his Junker status – for no German politician of his standing has had more bitter words to say about the Prussian landed nobility. He was the product of two different social and political cultures – the Junkers on his father’s side and the German liberalism of the early nineteenth century on his mother’s. His mother was of middle class origin, and was the decisive voice in the determination of his education. He did not go through the cadet institutes but went to a bourgeois Gymnasium to be imbued with the ideals of a humanist culture. The finished product of these dual influences was a politician who had a sharper eye for the strengths and weaknesses of both conservatives and liberals than had most of his contemporaries. Precisely that insight gave him the ability to handle them both efficiently.
Under Bismarck the interaction of administrative measures and outside events helped to narrow the gap between liberals and conservatives and ultimately almost closed it. He was aware that within Germany there were still forces strong enough to obstruct a policy of moral conquest; that Europe also was not too anxious to see the formation of a new powerful national state in its midst. Hence Bismarck’s phrase about the questions of the day having to be decided by ‘iron and blood’, a phrase used as a weapon against his opponents in the diet rather than as a proclamation of his political course.
Instead of letting the conflict continue to simmer, Bismarck decided to bring it to a head immediately. Since the diet objected to the military appropriations of the budget and since there was little chance that the measure would fare any better if submitted to the new session in January 1863, Bismarck had the entire budget voted down in the Prussian upper house. The parliamentary session was thus closed for 1862 and the Prussian government declared that it would continue the army reorganization and make the necessary expenditure available, in the hope that the diet would finally confirm it post facto. Bismarck ingeniously argued that there was a loophole in the Prussian constitution because it did not say what should be done if government and diet could not agree on the budget. He refused to accept the point that this effectively meant open conflict between monarchic prerogative and parliamentarian democracy, and instead made it clear that the fundamental powers residing the crown compelled it to continue in the execution of its duties until the moment when agreement between crown and diet was reached.
At the same time an issue which deeply stirred German national sentiment, that of Schleswig-Holstein, again came into the public eye. King Frederick VII of Demark, yielding to the pressure of Danish nationalists and contrary to the London Protocol of 1852, separated Schleswig from Holstein, annexing the former and introducing a new constitution for the latter. The diet of the German Confederation called upon Frederick to stop this policy. When the Danish government refused the German Confederation decided to intervene. Two civil commissioners supported by 6,000 troops were to take over the administration in Schleswig-Holstein. But the Danes stole the march by accepting a constitution applicable to Schleswig as well as Holstein, which meant Schleswig’s annexation and its separation from Holstein. Frederick died on 15 November 1863 without having been able to sign the constitution. The following day, on the basis of the London Protocol, Prince Christian of Glucksburg was proclaimed as King Christian IX, while at the same time Prince Frederick of Augustenburg released a proclamation in which he announced his succession in Schleswig-Holstein as Duke Frederick VII. Frederick found immediately support in Holstein and among national and liberal opinion in Germany. Both Prussia and Austria decided to ignore the national support in Germany, though for different reasons. Austria’s policy was the result of Napoleon III’s plan to revise the treaties of 1815 according to the principle of nationality, a plan which the events in Denmark had given him occasion to voice again. This particularly threatened Austria’s legitimist position, especially in her restless Venetian province. In practical terms what Austria aimed at in the Schleswig-Holstein question was the restoration of the previous personal union between the duchies and Denmark.
Bismarck, however, thought in terms of their annexation, a course on which William I was initially very reluctant to follow Bismarck’s advice, arguing that Prussia possessed no rights to claim these duchies. Bismarck pointed out that Augustenburg’s claims were equally doubtful, and that there was also another possible outcome to the situation, namely the creation of a new small state, which as far as Prussia was concerned would offer no guarantees as to its future political direction. The wishes of German public opinion would best be met if Prussia, with the agreement of the German Confederation excepting Austria, declared war on Denmark and then placed Augustenburg on the throne. However, that policy would not only result in the opposition of Austria but was more likely also to risk the opposition of the western powers, particularly France who was eager to gain the left bank of the Rhine – Olmutz could be repeated. To act jointly with Austria would be the course most likely to prevent the formation of a European coalition. Although William was convinced by Bismarck, neither Queen Augusta nor the Crown Prince and his wife were; on the contrary they supported the Augustenburg cause. Bismarck pointed out that the supporters of the Augustenburg cause in Prussia were those who were causing so much obstruction in the Prussian diet, another point which rallied William in favor of the policy pursued by his chancellor.
After the peace of Vienna in 1864, the territories in the joint possession of Prussia and Austria were a new point around which Prusso-Austrian differences could crystallize. The suggestion was made that Prussia in return for the duchies should cede the country of Glatz to Austria. This was unacceptable to William, and neither was he willing to have the Augustenburg family installed in Schleswig-Holstein. When the diet of the German Confederation voted in favor of this, supported by the Austrian vote but against that of Prussia, Bismarck envisaged war. But conditions was not favorable, and neither was William. On 21 July 1865 Austria was asked by Prussia to suppress, jointly with Prussia, the Augustenburg agitation; the alternative offered was that Prussia would look after its own interests. Austria, engulfed by an economic crisis and internal political instability, did not wish to risk a conflict and in accordance with a suggestion from the Austrian envoy in Munich, a plan for partition of the administration of Schleswig-Holstein was drawn up which provided a basis of discussion. The Convention of Gastein of 14 August 1865 brought Holstein under Austrian administration, Schleswig under that of Prussia.
To most statesman it was clear that this was only a temporary arrangement, and that the Prusso-Austrian dualism would have to be resolved sooner or later. First of all Bismarck secured his flanks – Russia in the east and France in the west. A trade agreement between Prussia and France had existed since 1862, concluded outside the customs union. Napoleon III believed he could exploit a Prussian-Austrian conflict for the good of what he saw as the French national interest. In the same way as he had supported the movement for Italian unity for a price (Saxony and Cote d’Azur), so he thought he could profit by taking Luxembourg, then still a customs union with Germany, or the Walloon part of Belgium. Bismarck raised no objections, willing to sacrifice the territories as diplomatic bait, in the vital cause of French neutrality. By an alliance of Prussia with Italy on 8 April 1866, Italy agreed to declare war on Austria once military conflict between Prussia and Austria had begun.
Bismarck demanded in Frankfurt a reform of the German Confederation. The wind was taken out of everyone’s sails by Bismarck’s startling demand for a federal parliament elected by universal male franchise. It was one of Bismarck’s most brilliant moves. The three-class franchise had so far favored the opposition in the Prussian diet, and plans of utilizing the peasant and working class vote in the support of conservative aims had already been aired in 1848. In a still predominantly agrarian society the rural population could be expected to be a bulwark of conservatism. Already in 1863 Bismarck had made contract with Ferdinand LaSalle, the leader of the working class movement, and LaSalle had reasoned favorably. But this new move also had the appearance of being the first step towards a genuine parliamentary system in Germany as well as Prussia and was therefore bound to appeal to the middle classes throughout Germany. Precisely those who for the past four years had opposed Bismarck found that perhaps a first step in their direction was being taken. The ultimate aim was the creation of a German federal state under Prussian leadership, though because of Napoleon this could not be publicly proclaimed. Yet in the immediate future Bismarck’s expectation was not fully realized. The suspiciousness which he had engendered over the previous four years were too deep-seated to be quieted by one gesture. National liberal opinion throughout Germany remained extremely skeptical.
Quite unexpectedly Napoleon now entered the fray. He made contact with Austria with the aim of persuading it to hand over Venetia to France, in return for which he would not enter the war against Austria. Bismarck had not expected this. It delayed his schedule. A new compromise solution was submitted as an alternative to German unification which involved dividing Germany between the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs. Bismarck found the plan acceptable, but not so Vienna. But Napoleon’s intervention failed because the Italians did not want Venetia from his hands. They had had occasion to notice previously that gifts from Napoleon came to be rather costly in the end. In the meantime Saxony, Bavaria and Wurttemberg had also mobilized. Napoleon put forward another proposal, that of a European congress, to resolve the whole problem on the principle of nationality. Austria made it a precondition that all territories of its state be guaranteed beforehand. That put an end to the proposal. In the diet of the German Confederation Austria as well as Prussia declared that their respective suggestions had been rejected and Austria added that it would submit the Schleswig-Holstein question to the diet and to the estates of Holstein. Prussia declared this a breach of the Convention of Gastein, and General Manteuggel moved his troops into Holstein which the Austrians evacuated. Prussia then declared itself prepared to discuss the Schleswig-Holstein issue but only in connection with its plans for the reform of the German Confederation, which now including the explicit exclusion of Austria from it. To placate Bavarian feeling, Bavaria was to retain its own military high command, but Bavaria, fearing for its independence, joined Austria. Austria now demanded the mobilizations for all the forces of the German Confederation. On 12 June the diplomatic relations between Prussia considered every vote in the diet for Austria as a declaration of war. On 14 June four Kingdoms voted for Austria: Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria and Wurttemberg; then came Hesse and Nassau, Frankfurt and Meiningen. In southern Germany only Baden voted for Prussia. Luxembourg too, took Prussia’s side, as did most of northern Germany. The Prussian army received orders to enter Saxony, Hesse and Hanover. War began formally on 18 June 1866.
By 18 July the Prussian headquarters were at Nikolsburg, 19 kilometers from Vienna. Actually Prussia’s military situation was not as strong as Koniggratz might have suggested. It was not a decisive victory, and though beaten, Benedek’s armies were still able to extract themselves from the threat of encirclement and cross the Danube at Pressburg in order to join up with the forces of the victor of Custozza, Archduke Albert. At the same time a cholera epidemic raged though the Prussian armies taking heavier tolls than the actual fighting. The lines of communications also favored Austria rather than Prussia. And what if the Austrian army withdrew beyond Vienna? Bismarck with his own brand of sardonic humor suggest that in view of the difficulty of maintaining communication with Prussia it would be best to leave Prussia behind and march upon Constantinople to found a new Byzantine Empire. In short Prussia was as much in need of a speedy settlement as was Austria.
The preliminary peace came just in time. Russia had called for a peace congress and Napoleon began to press demands such as Landlau and Luxembourg as compensation for Prussia’s gains. Bismarck rejected any French territorial gains at the expense of German territory. But the French clamored to add Saarbrucken and Saarlouis to their demands as well as all the territories of Bavaria and Baden on the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia’s response was one of outright refusal. Napoleon, unable to support his demands with military action, withdrew his claims to German territory and instead demanded the annexation of Belgium. Bismarck let it be known that he was prepared to consider Belgium. But the French envoy in Berlin, Benedetti, was careless enough to submit in writing a draft treaty which included this demand, and this Bismarck was able to use at the appropriate time to bring the other powers, especially Great Britain, into play. Napoleon let the matter rest.
The negotiations for a final peace between Prussia and Austria came to their conclusion in Vienna on 23 August 1866. On the following day the German Confederation was formally dissolved. Prussia gained Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Kurhesse, Nassau and other Hessian territories as well as the city of Frankfurt.
The constitution of the North German Confederation was accepted on 16 April 1867 by 230 votes to 33. It became legally effective on 1 July of that year. The Prussian crown was granted the presidency as an inheritable office, and it retained supreme command of the armed forces, control of the conduct of foreign policy, the right to make and to end wars, and the prerogative of appointing the federal chancellor. But all the president’s actions required the chancellor’s counter-signature. Prussia had achieved predominance in the Bundesrat, with 17 of the 43 votes. The chancellor could not be dismissed by the diet. The diet had legislative powers in granting the budget and economic legislation.
Bismarck may have intended ‘to ruin parliamentarianism by parliamentarianism’, as he himself boasted. In fact, he made Germany a constitutional country. Not only was the franchise the widest in Europe, with the only effective secret ballot. The parliament possessed every essential function. It was the seat of power. The King of Prussia, later called German emperor, directed the executive; but so did, and does, the president of the United States. And both president and emperor were closely bound by the terms of a written constitution. Bismarck was a parliamentary statesman exactly like Sir Robert Walpole or the younger Pitt, even though, like them, he depended on Royal favor.
France objected to a Hohenzollern attempting to become King of Spain so the two nations Prussia and France went to war in 1870 with the French suffering a large defeat at Sedan on 2 September 1870. Since the victory at Sedan Bismarck had been anxious to convert military victory in political capital by creating a unified German federal (but not unitary) state, as was the wish of the Liberals. From October onwards south German politicians visited the headquarters at Versailles to discuss their entry into an extended North German Confederation, or the creation of a new federal state. Bismarck possessed enough historical consciousness to make allowances for the particularistic traditions of the German states. The diet of the North German Confederation sent a delegation of the three under the leadership of Eduard Simson to ask William to accept the imperial dignity. On the surface continuity with 1849 had been re-established.
The formal proclamation of the German Empire took place in the Hall of Mirrors of Versailles, 170 years exactly after Prussia had become a kingdom. Among those present no civilians were to be seen; Bismarck had donned a uniform, the delegates of the diet were not present. It was a moment of exultation for all except the man who would become Emperor, who privately shed tears because he foresaw the dilution of Prussia and nearly refused to attend the ceremony of proclamation. During the day of the proclamation he virtually ignored Bismarck. A preliminary peace between Germany and France was signed on 6 May 1871, followed by a final peace settlement of 6 May in Frankfurt.
In Germany it was a moment of national rejoicing. ‘Through what has one deserved God’s grace, to experience such great and powerful events?’ asked the historian Heinrich von Sybel. Previous critics of Bismarck like Treitschke, Gustav Freytag and Berthold Auerbach, were won over. The majority of the German people saw in the foundation of the German Empire the fulfillment of their national wishes and of German history.
Yet Bismarck’s policy had been consistent with the Prussian tradition of putting the security and internal stability of the state above all other considerations. This is best shown in the Bismarckian constitution adopted by the German Reichstag on 16 April 1871. As an instrument of government it was as much a creation of statecraft as it was legislation. Hence to approach it from a narrowly constitutional angle would tend to confuse rather than elucidate the complexity of its structure. The peculiarity of this structure is immediately evident in its preamble, which speaks of ‘the eternal union for the protection of the federal territory and the law within it, as well as for the care of the welfare of the German people.’ This seems a legal paradox, because either the constitution is the product of a union of equal partners and in consequence a treaty, or the constitution is the law in which case no room is left for a treaty. Theoretically at least, the two approaches are mutually exclusive. But that such a situation is not unique is more than amply borne out by the constitution of the United States of America.
The German constitution can be understood only by recognizing that it did in fact embody the two mutually exclusive structures of federalism and the unitary state, of treaty and law. The fundamental question which this left open at the time was whether the principle of democratic legitimacy had overcome that of monarchic legitimacy – and it is precisely in this ambiguity that part of the Bismarckian compromise lies. The constitution of 1871 was the product of the desire for German unification and at he aims of the German middle class as exemplified by the representation of the German people in the Reichstag on the basis of universal male franchise. The Reichstag’s essential function was participation in legislation. Any proposed piece of legislation had to have the consent of both the Reichstag and the Bundesrat before it could be enacted, and the Reichstag could also initiate legislation. However, unlike parliaments of today, the Reichstag was not overburdened by this task.
Consequently in practical terms its main function was the exercise of those rights which allowed it to influence the imperial administration, its main power resting in its control of the purse. From the point of view of the Reichstag the constitution was unitary and took the form of law. But at the same time, looked at from the point of view of the Bundesrat, the constitution was federal. Here several German states were represented, the monarchic principle was the important part of the constitution, and the legal aspect was that of a treaty. In order to prevent potential party strife from cracking a structure formidable no doubt to the outside world but highly fragile to the experienced eye of Bismarck, neither foreign policy, nor the army, nor the government in the person of the chancellor were made subject to direct parliamentary control By excluding so large an area from the direct interference of the Reichstag, its role (apart from that of controlling the budget) was restricted to that of a safety valve for potential discontent and an indicator of public opinion, both of which, if necessary, could be taken into account by suitable action from above.