With the death of Frederick the Great ended a phase of the political development of the Prussian state which had begun with the reign of the Great Elector. Within a century and a half a state had been formed, but not only that, it had developed its own specific character, unique within the context of the Age of Enlightened Absolutism. Frederick as King, like his father, had demonstrated the professional aspect of monarchy in a manner which could hardly be continued or surpassed. His figure stands at the end of a thousand years of European history, at the beginning of which period there was interdependence between crown and church while at the end royal dignity had become entirely secularized. Frederick William I had still considered himself a servant of God; not so his son, whose concept of royalty was entirely secular yet ennobled through the monarch’s own absolute subjugation to his duty to the state.
The role of the monarch had changed profoundly in the Age of Enlightened Absolutism. No longer was his role determined by the consciousness of the divine origin of his office but by his ability to rule his subjects. One of the inherent consequences of this change was one of potentially revolutionary character. No dynasty could expect to produce a trinity of such high ability as was shown by Great Elector, Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, and lack of ability was bound to lead at least to the demand to transform the absolute monarchy into a constitutional one, a move which while moving the monarch from public criticism set quite clearly defined limits on his power. In other words, there is no longer any area left free from state intervention or, so to speak, from reform from above. The resulting inevitable infringement of ancient liberties by the state was bound to collide with the principles of liberty as advocated by the Enlightenment. Indeed the Enlightenment saw in the enlightened despot the executor of its principles; it used enlightened absolutism as much as the latter used the Enlightenment. As the example of Frederick the Great eloquently demonstrates, the monarch himself determined which reforms he desired and which could in practice be accomplished.
Any successor of Frederick was bound to be measured by the yardstick he had established and to fall short. Inevitably he would stand in the shadow of the Great King. Even more so when the successor was man of the character of Frederick William II. ‘The much beloved’, as Berliners use to call him because of his paramours, or ‘fat William’, because of the width of his girth as well as his truly Herculean proportions, was the son of a younger brother of Frederick, Prince Augustus William and his wife Princess Louise Amalie of Brunswich-Bevern, the sister of Frederick’s wife. After the death of Augustus William his son Frederick William, born in 1744, was next in line of succession. Like all Prussian princes he was compelled to participate actively in the profession of arms and in his early years at least seems to have made a good impression on his uncle, an impression which Frederick was to revise a year before his death when he said to his minister Hoym: ‘I will tell you what will happen after my death: there will be much merry-making at court, my nephew will squander the treasure and let the army degenerate. Women will rule and the state will come to ruin. Then you will have to say to your King: “This is impossible! The treasure is the country’s not yours!” And if my nephew reacts with anger, then you will tell him “It is I who have ordered it!” Perhaps this will help because he has not a bad heart…’ His reign was the classic case demonstrating that absolute monarchy is as strong and as absolute as the monarch himself-or weak.
The last of the 18th century saw a rise in land values which specifically in Prussia gave an uplift to a speculative agrarian capitalism with the inherent tendency of giving greater economic independence to the Prussian landed nobility. At the same time, the slow but steady growth of industrialization favorably affected the middle class. As both aristocracy and to a lesser extent, the middle class were represented in the Prussian bureaucracy, unmistakably signs of the latter’s growing self-confidence became frequent, signs which Frederick the Great had duly noticed and endeavored to counteract. Succeeded by an incomparably weaker monarch, the power of the crown declined; the death of Frederick the Great was also the end of royal absolutism in Prussia. Into its place stepped bureaucratic authoritarianism rule by a bureaucracy whose implicit task it was to administer the state in such a manner as to prevent the eruption of civil unrest.
The most significant piece of legislation enacted during the reign of Frederick William II was the Code of 1794, the Allgemeine Preussiche Landrecht. Yet in the words of that most incisive analyst of his time, Alexis de Tocqueville,
Of all the works of Frederick the Great, the least known, even in his own country, is the code drawn up by his orders, and promulgated by his successor. Yet I doubt whether any of his other works throws as much light on the mind of the man or on the times in which he lived, or shows so plainly the influence which they exercised one upon another
This code was a real constitution in the ordinary sense of the word. It regulated not only the mutual relations of citizens, but also their relations to the state. It was a civil code a criminal code and a charter all in one.
It rests or appears to rest on a certain number of general principles, express in a highly philosophical and abstract form and which bear a strong resemblance in many respects to those which are embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the Constitution of 1791.
Theoretically the Code, or what de Tocqueville sees as a constitution, was based on a social contract in which individuals part with their natural rights only in so far as this is necessary for the state to ensure the free development of their personality, their prosperity, their education and their private happiness. From that derive a number of basic rights: protection of person and property, equality before the law, independence of the judiciary, equality of the sexes, liberty of religion and of conscience, the right to education and the pursuit of one’s own happiness, ‘general rights of mankind’ which determine and limit the task and the duties of the state. In the final draft Suarez, influenced by the First Constitution of the French Revolution, argued that it was impossible to deny man the right to develop his abilities and to deploy all the qualities he had been given by nature in the pursuit of his own happiness. These natural and inalienable rights would remain with man after his transition into a bourgeois society and there could be no legislative power which possessed the right to deprive him of these. This also meant pruning royal sovereignty, especially in its interference in the judiciary process. In the promulgated version of the Code Frederick William II had this clause eliminated; nevertheless the tendency is clearly visible to create a Rechtsstaat, a state based upon law, in which liberal basic laws are made binding upon the monarch as well as the judiciary and the administration.
Even the final version of the code:
Makes no allusion to any hereditary rights of the sovereign, nor to his family, nor even to any particular rights as distinguished from that of the state. The royal power was already designated by no other name than that of the state.
On the other hand, it alludes to the rights of man, which are founded on the natural right of everyone to pursue his own happiness without treading on the rights of others. All acts not forbidden by natural law, or a positive state law, are allowable. Every citizen is entitled to claim the protection of the state for himself and his property, and may defend himself by using force if the state does not come to his
defense. (de Tocqueville)
But the actual application of the Code differed rather from its underlying liberal philosophy. Prussian society according to the Code is still essentially envisaged as an organic growth, a corporate structure of estates of times past, rather than a growing bourgeois society. It remains the old three-tier system of peasants, burghers, and nobility. Each tier has its own substructure. But whereas in the Middle Ages, for instance, this type of society gave to each of its estates and their subgroups their own privileges, and to some extent even legal autonomy, the Code deprived them of these and subordinated them to the purposes of the state, a state which as a conceptual abstraction was conterminous with the general welfare of all its components. Hence the Code carried in itself the contradiction between a traditional society and a bourgeois-liberal constitution. All estates were directed towards the estate as the focal centre for their activity. Hence a paradox again that for the purpose of achieving ultimately liberal ends, traditional norms of social, political and economic behavior were transformed into legal decrees which regulated all these aspects down to the smallest detail. Once again we see a typical example of the traditional absorption inaugurated by Frederick William I, that of the institutional absorption of social, economic, and political conflict in order to maintain and strengthen the state.
When revolution broke out in France, Prussia sided with Austria. Since 1740, for over half a century, antagonism had been their characteristic feature. The Convention of Reichenbach inaugurated a policy of alliance and co-operation between the two major German powers which continued 50 years. Frederick William II, believing that the French revolutionary army could be dispersed by disciplined Prussian troops much in the same way as the Dutch revolutionaries had been a few years before, actively supported a policy of war against revolutionary France. On 7 February 1792 Prussia and Austria concluded a formal alliance in which Prussia promised 20,000 men in support of the war against France. Although Leopold II died on 1 March 1792, his successor Francis II received the French declaration of war on 20 April 1792.
Catherine the Great thought this moment opportune to obtain easy gains in Poland, especially since she was aware that Frederick William for his part had similar ideas for the further aggrandizement of Prussia. Austria would have preferred to see a restoration of Poland as envisaged in its preliminary alliance with Prussia, for this would have contained Russia as well as Prussia. But Russia was already moving troops into Poland in 1792. Prussia came to an understanding with Russia about a further partition of Poland without prior consultation with Austria, and Russia’s invasion of Poland was followed by a Prussian invasion in 1793, each power occupying the territories it wished to annex. Austria was seriously offended, but there was little it could do to reverse the de facto annexation of Danzig, Thorun and the regions of Posen, Gnesen and Kalish, 2,716 square kilometers containing 1,130,000 inhabitants. In the face of the rape of their country patriotic Poles made one last stand under Thaddeus Kosciuszko. They gathered their remaining strength and dissipated it in one might uprising which ended with the defeat of the Polish cause by November 1795. The rising was treated as an attempt at revolution, with the consequences usually attendant upon such occurrences when they fail. Vast confiscation of land took place in Prussian-occupied Poland, characterized by greed and corruption among the higher echelons of the Prussian civil service. The internal instability which had characterized Poland for more than a century and a half had given cause for many to ask the question as to how long Poland would last as a sovereign state. This question was of course aggravated by the rise of Russia in the east and Prussia in the west. With that development Poland’s days as a great European power were numbered. And as our own century has shown, the existence of a buffer state with the ambitions of a great power contains too many contradictions to ensure its independence.
The campaign against the French ended with the Peace of Basle but had left its mark on Frederick William II. His health deteriorated rapidly and a long illness ensued during which he was cared for by Wilhelmine Enke, until he died aged 53 on 16 November 1797.
After Prussia had left the coalition in 1795 Austria had battled on for another two years and ended the First Revolutionary War with the Peace of Camp Formio, suffering heavy losses in territory among them the entire left bank of the Rhine. Two years later the second round was fought in league with Great Britain and Russia, Naples, Portugal and Turkey. They were no match for Napoleon, who had speedily returned from Egypt. In 1801 Emperor Francis at the Treaty of Luneville had openly to acknowledge the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. And then, in 1805, again in league with England and Russia, Austria fought Napoleon’s victory at Austerliz put an end to that attempt as well and the Peace of Pressburg of December 1805 gave Napoleon a free hand in Europe while Austria suffered further territorial losses.
Napoleon’s impact upon Germany was profound. In the territories on the right bank of the Rhine rapid transformation took place. The chequered political and territorial pattern made way for one that was simpler and more rational. Irrespective of the claims of the church and the nobility ancient structures were demolished and replaced by those thought to be suitable to the time; changes and replacements carried out under the auspices of the principles of the French Revolution and Napoleon’s urge to expand his power. Napoleon, since 1804 Emperor of the French, became the initiator and protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, that league of German princes who sought their fortunes under the sign of the tricolor, some of the princes, like the Elector of Bavaria, lowering themselves to the level of receiving royal dignity at the hands of the usurper.
But all will to resist Napoleon had not evaporated within Prussia’s leadership. Prussia’s political attitude was feeble, it was humiliating, but if its lack of resoluteness in adhering to its former allies is clear, equally clear is the lack of decisively siding with Napoleon. This not only illustrates the lack of decision at the centre of Prussia’s leadership, but also the fear that once on the side of Napoleon, Prussia’s position would be reduced to that of a satellite power. While having concluded the treaty with Napoleon, Prussia still maintained its connections with Russia. Napoleon suggested that as a pendant to the Confederation of the Rhine, Prussia should call into being a North German Federation which together with Austria should be one of the three powers in Germany. While making this proposal Napoleon was preparing for a campaign against Prussia. French armies were approaching the Prussian frontiers from southern and western Germany. Rumors circulated that Napoleon intended to deprive Prussia of Hanover again in order to use it as a bargaining object in negotiations with Great Britain.
At long last on 6 August 1806 Frederick William III mobilized the Prussian army and sent an ultimatum to Napoleon demanding the withdrawal of French troops from the frontiers of Prussia and the return of several Prussian territories of the lower Rhine which were held by the French. Napoleon did not bother to reply to the demands; he simply demanded that Prussia withdraw its mobilizing orders.
The Prussian army expected to meet Napoleon west of the Thuringian forest. Totally misunderstanding the rapidity with which Napoleon could move his forces the Prussian army approached that region. But already on 10 October 1806 the Prussian vanguard was defeated by the French at Saalfeld, an engagement in which Prince Louis Ferdinand was killed. In their rapid advance the French forces bypassed the Prussians on their flank, penetrating to their rear. On 14 October 1806 the battles of Jena and Auerstadt were fought, which for Prussia were absolutely disastrous.
Frederick William III and his family, together with the government, fled beyond the river Oder. Freiherr von Stein just managed to save the treasury from the French. A preliminary peace was signed at the Charlottenburg on 30 October 1806 but the ink had hardly dried when Napoleon changed his mind, saying he was willing to conclude an armistice only if Prussia was prepared to serve as an operational base for a French attack against Russia. Frederick William voted against this and his advisors suggestions. The King’s decision separated the wheat from the chaff among his advisors. Men like Stein and Hardenberg now came to the fore to direct Prussia’s fortunes. By that time Frederick William and his court had moved to Konigsberg, the French army close on their heels.
Prussia, under the direction Hardenberg, signed a treaty with Great Britain on 26 April 1807 to defeat Napoleon. On 14 June 1807 Napoleon beat Bennigsen at the battle of Friedland, Czar Alexander asked Napoleon for an armistice. Eleven days later on 25 June, the two emperors met on a raft on the river Memel and concluded an agreement at the expense of Prussia. While Russia was not to sustain any loses, Prussia was to pay the bill, its existence suffered by Napoleon only as a favor to Alexander. In vain; on 9 July 1807 at the Treaty of Tilsit Prussia lost all its territories west of the Elbe. Prussia was reduced to 7311 square kilometers with a population of 4.5 million. From the western provinces Prussia lost, the kingdom of Westphalia was formed, on the throne of which Napoleon put his youngest brother Jerome. The treaty of Tilsit was supplemented by the Convention of Konigsberg of 12 July 1807 in which Napoleon stipulated that he would withdraw his occupying forces from Prussia only when the reparation payments demanded had been paid. As yet no figure had been determined.